Edith Cowan University

Research Online
ECU Publications 2012
1-1-2012

Utilizing the RFID LOCK Command Against Multiple Targets
Christopher Bolan

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworks2012
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons
This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of: Bolan, C. M. (2012). Utilizing the RFID LOCK Command Against
Multiple Targets. Proceedings of International Conference on Security and Management. (pp. 695-697). Las Vegas,
Nevada, USA. CSREA Press. Available here
This Conference Proceeding is posted at Research Online.
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworks2012/147

Utilizing the RFID LOCK Command Against Multiple
Targets
C. Bolan
School of Computer and Security Science, Edith Cowan University, Perth, Western Australia
secau – Security Research Centre , Perth, Western Australia

Abstract - An unlocked Electronic Product Code (EPC) tag
allows for issuance of most commands without the need for
any authorization. This means that a system with unlocked
tags would allow any attacker to modify tag data at will,
whilst also opening the door to a range of other misuse. One
possible avenue of active misuse against unlocked tags would
be to issue LockID commands and ‘permanently’ lock some
or all of a system‘s RFID tags. As this attack is simply an
issuance of a valid command it fits firmly in the category of
an active misuse and could also be considered a limited form
of DoS as future valid commands would be ignored and limit
or cripple the functionality of a system dependent on
operation. This paper details an experiment using the LockID
command to lock multiple tags within range.
Keywords: Radiofrequency Identification, RFID Tags,
Information Security
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Introduction

Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) relies on
transponders which are incorporated into an object for the
purpose of identification or tracking [1]. The transponder (or
tag) may be used to store information and will respond to
signals sent by a transceiver (RFID reader) [2]. Increasingly
such technology is being incorporated into supply chain
management systems throughout the world and is expected to
eventually replace traditional bar-coding systems [3].
“The Electronic Product Code is an identification scheme for
universally identifying physical objects via Radio Frequency
Identification tags and other means” [4]. The electronic
product code (EPC) standards were created by EPCglobal as
an open, community based approach to promote the use of
RFID technology in supply chain management., while not
explicitly focused on security, the standards purport to
promote a secure environment for RFID use and protect both
individual and organizational privacy.
Whilst EPC tags were primarily designed for write once / read
many time applications they are able to be used in a variety of
means across their four states of operation (un-programmed,
programmed, locked and killed). These states dictate the
behaviour of the RFID Tag when a given command is issued.
The focus of this research was to investigate the use of the

lock state and its related LockID command and builds upon
previous work into directed LockID attacks.
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The LockID Command

According to the EPC standards [5], the LockID
command precludes further modification of values contained
on an RFID Tag. The command based upon a more specific
version of the ProgramID command whereby the [PTR] value
points to the most significant bit of the password location and
the [Value] must be equal to 0xA5 (hex value A5).
Given this command, the locking of an RFID tag may be
achieved through the following steps:
1. Program the KILL code and leave the lock code at
00h;
2. Verify the EPC code by issuing a ScrollallID or
VerifyID command;
3. Lock the tag by programming A5h to the Lock
location;
4. Check that the tag is locked by issuing a VerifyID
command. N
Note: If the tag is locked, the reader will receive no response
to this command.
Accordingly, once the tag has been locked it will no longer
respond to any programming commands, including the verify
command. This suggests that, as the tag does not respond to
the programming command, the lock code cannot be removed
making it permanently locked. Thus it has been suggested that
the only way to modify the tag at all is to utilize the kill
command with the programmed password, which will render
the tag inactive ‘forever’ [6]. Subsequent research has
demonstrated that resurrection after a tag has been killed is
possible – which has the duel effect of resetting the lock but at
a significant time cost for any significant tag volume [7].
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The Attack

To date a range of attacks have been developed against
systems utilizing this standard, but the LockID based attack
differs as it requires no password cracking or additional
equipment. Rather, the purpose behind this attack is to utilize
the existing controls of the standard to circumvent the systems
normal functionality.
The single lock attack is based on the principle of an attacker
selecting a single tag and locking that tag. At its base level

this attack is no different to a legitimate user locking a single
tag in any valid application. To test the validity of this attack a
standard tag / reader setup was created in the Faraday cage as
illustrated in figure 1.
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Figure 1 – Experimental Setup

Figure 2 – Single Lock Results

The experimental setup included the use of three EPC RFID
tags at a single time; this setup meant that a single tag from
the selection may be targeted and locked and the other two
may be tested to see if they remain unaltered, showing that a
targeted attack against a single tag is viable. As there were
three positions that could be occupied by the tags, it was
decided that the position of the tag to be locked would be
rotated amongst the three positions with each group.

Through experimentation it was found that their were two
feasible methods of issuing the attack. The first would be to
sequentially issue lock commands for every possible tag id
within the tag space. To determine the validity of this attack a
few simple calculations were conducted as detailed below:

Previous research on this targeted attack showed that the
attack was highly effective, In essence the researcher was able
to target a specific tag and lock the tag at will. This is
demonstrated in figure 2. This new extension of the research
was intended to demonstrate that such an attack would be
highly scalable. Whilst a large variety of tag numbers were
successfully attempted the discussion of results will be limited
to three tag setups for the sake of visual clarity.

Assuming 100 Lock operations a second:

Tag Identifier Space = 96 bits = 296 =
79228162514264337593543950336

Complete Lock Attack Time = 296 / 100 =
220078229206289826648734 hours
= 9169926216928742777031 days
= 25123085525832171992 years
Clearly such an attack method would be infeasible, even if a
reader could somehow be increased tenfold to allow 1000 lock
operations per second, the attack would still take far beyond a
single lifetime. With this established, the second more feasible
approach was considered whereby the reader would first
conduct an inventory of the tags in the area of the attacking
machine and then use the list of detected tags to issue focused
lock commands.
In figure 3 below, three tags are setup in the cage with an
attacking transceiver set to commence operation at a specified
interval. From the figure it is clear to see that the attacks occur

almost in parallel. Such results were paralleled with every size
of victim sample trialed in the study.
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In the standards used for this experiment, the victim would
likely find it difficult if not impossible to defend or detect the
attack in time to make a difference. Whilst the EPC standard
is rapidly evolving many existing setups may be the target of
similar attacks though their currently seems to be a lack of
evidence for such attacks taking place within the wider
community. This may either be due to a lack of motive in the
attackers or the rarity of such setups.
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Figure 3 – LockID against multiple tags
Whilst either approach would constitute an active attack (i.e.
one that requires direct interaction), it would be possible to
integrate the collection method with an eavesdropping attack.
Whilst such an attack may take longer to directly target all
transponders that were contacted by legitimate users. Such
attack blending could limit the detectability of the attack and
reduce the likelihood of countermeasures being successfully
created and deployed.
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Conclusion

The paper presented a small but significant extension to the
previously documented single lock attack. The simplicity of
this approach is that like its directed counterpart the attack
requires nothing beyond the standard equipment. The single
LockID research demonstrated how the command may be
targeted to an individual tag without altering the standard
functionality of the RFID reader. Similarly the multiple vector
attack was shown to work without the modification of the
attacking transceiver.
Through the evidence of the multiple attacks efficacy and the
two feasible methods of target gathering it is clear that such a
method may be employed to attack complaint RFID systems.
An example of this attack would be a Supermarket whereby
the attacker could lock all tags in the store preventing prices
(stored on the tag) from being altered. In this scenario, every
affected transponder would need to be killed and resurrected
to return to normal operation. Even using fairly conservative
figures there would likely be a significant cost in time and lost
revenue.
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